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AIRLINE LIABILITY - THE WARSAW CONVENTION NINTH CIRCUIT RULES PASSENGER'S DEVELOPMENT
OF DEEP-VEIN THROMBOSIS IS NOT AN
"ACCIDENT" UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION:
RODRIGUEZ V. ANSETT AUSTRALIA, LTD.
AMANDA KAY MORSE

NTERNATIONAL AIR transportation is subject to the rules of
the Warsaw Convention ("Convention"),' a uniform body of
legal rules governing the liability and rights of air carriers and
their passengers.2 Article 17 of the Convention holds an international air carrier liable for the death or bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing the damage occurred on board
the aircraft or in the course of any operations of embarking or
disembarking.' The meaning of the term "accident" is of central importance to the invocation of liability. Because the Convention provides no definition for the term and French
continental jurists drafted its contents against the background
of French law, the Supreme Court, in Air France v. Saks, deferred
to French law in determining its meaning.4 The Court defined
"accident" as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening
that is external to the passenger. '' 5 Recently, in Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd., the Ninth Circuit, relying on the Saks definition, held that an international air passenger's development of
Deep-Vein Thrombosis ("DVT") did not constitute an "acci-

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2004) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2

Rodriguez v. Ansett Austl. Ltd., 383 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2004).

3

Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.

4 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985).

5 Id. at 405. The Court noted that "[tlhe definition should be flexibly applied
after an assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries."

Id.
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dent" under the Warsaw Convention.6 In doing so, the court
effectively limited airline liability for failing to warn passengers
of the risks of DVT and for failing to make recommendations
for its prevention.
On September 30, 2000, while traveling from Los Angeles,
California to Melbourne, Australia, Adriene Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") developed DVT aboard an Air New Zealand aircraft.7
While Rodriguez slept during the twelve-hour flight from Los
Angeles to Auckland, New Zealand, a blood clot formed and
broke into smaller clots that became lodged in her lungs.8 She
neither ate nor left her seat for that period.9 As Rodriguez exited the aircraft in New Zealand she collapsed in the jetway, and
upon regaining consciousness, discovered that she had no control over her right arm and could not speak. 10
Rodriguez filed suit against Air New Zealand in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the airline's conduct caused her DVT and thus constituted an "accident" under the Convention." Specifically, she
claimed that Air New Zealand negligently operated the aircraft,
thereby proximately causing her injuries. 12 In addition, she alleged that the airline acted with willful misconduct by intentionally violating safety procedures, failing to properly design the
aircraft, and failing to inform passengers of the risks of DVT
during long flights. 3 Air New Zealand filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that Rodriguez's DVT was not
an "accident" under the Convention.14 The district court held
that Rodriguez failed to demonstrate that an "accident" had
caused her injury, as there was no admissible evidence that she
developed DVT from an unexpected or unusual event external
Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 919. DVT is often developed on international flights.
Id. It is initiated by the formation of a blood clot in one of the deep veins of the
body, starting in areas where blood moves more slowly, especially when exercise
is limited. Id. DVT is a serious condition because it may block the blood flow or
result in a pulmonary embolism or fatal stroke. Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Attorneys of California in Support of Appellant Adriene Rodriguez, Rodriguez, 383 F.3d 914 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae].
7 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 915.
8 Id.
9 Id.
6

10

Id.

11 Id.
13

at 915-16.
Id. at 916.
Id.

14

Id.

12
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to her.' 5 The court granted summary judgment in favor of Air
New Zealand.'" Rodriguez appealed the district court's ruling
7
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.'" Its holding relied on two conclusions: (1)
Rodriguez's development of DVT did not constitute an "accident" under the Convention, and (2) Rodriguez failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Air New Zealand
followed industry custom.19
Article 17 of the Convention provides that a "carrier shall be
liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking. '
Consequently, in order for the Ninth Circuit to hold Air New
Zealand liable, Rodriguez had to establish that an Article 17 "accident" caused her injuries. 2' The court applied the Supreme
Court's definition of "accident" first espoused in Air France v.
Saks, that "an accident is an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger. "22
More recently, the Supreme Court reiterated this definition
in Olympic Airways v. Husain. Applying the Supreme Court's definition, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Rodriguez failed to allege such an event external to herself that prompted her
development of DVT.2 3 The Court noted that whether the aircraft was operating under normal conditions was not even a
question." In support of her claim, Rodriguez relied on two
2002 WL
15 Rodriguez v. Ansett Austl., Ltd., No. CVO1-7882JFW(SHX),
32153953, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2002), aftfd, 383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2004).
16 Id.
18

Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 916.
Id. at 919.

19

Id.

17

Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
21 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 916.
22 470 U.S. at 405. Saks held that a passenger's hearing loss from an aircraft
with no pressurization problems was not an accident, as it resulted from "the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation
of the aircraft." Id. at 406.
23 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 918 (citing Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644,
653 (2004)).
24 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 917-18 (citing Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d
603, 605 (9th Cir. 1993)).
20
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cases. 2' First, in Fulop v. Malev HungarianAirlines, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that a flight crew's decision not to divert an aircraft following a
passenger's heart attack is an "accident" if the flight crew's actions fail to comply with the airline's operational standards.2 6
Second, Rodriguez referred to the district court's decision in
Olympic Airways v. Husain,which held an airline liable for a flight
attendant's refusal of a passenger's requests for removal from a
smoking section that resulted in the passenger's death following
an asthma attack. 27 According to the Ninth Circuit, situations
involving a response by a flight crew to a passenger's medical
condition should be distinguished from those regarding the development of DVT. 28 Because there was no response by the
flight crew in this case and thus no event external to Rodriguez,
the court found this case factually distinct from Fulop and
Husain.2 9
The Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether an airline's fail30
ure to warn of DVT can constitute an Article 17 "accident.
The evidence Rodriguez submitted consisted of scientific articles, newspaper articles, and in-flight magazines. Although Rodriguez offered this evidence to prove what the airlines knew or
should have known about the dangers of DVT, the court found
these exhibits lacking because they provided no information regarding the existence of either an industry standard or an Air
New Zealand policy to warn of DVT 1 Upon examination of the
evidence, the court took specific note of an in-flight magazine
which recommended passengers drink water and exercise during long flights. The panel found it compelling that Rodriguez
had, indeed, read that particular magazine. 2
In reviewing Rodriguez's failure to warn contention, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Blansett v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.3 Similar to the instant case, Blansett
concerned an international passenger's development of DVT
25 Id.
26 Id.

(citing Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 664-66
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
27 Id. (citing Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 540 U.S. 644 (2004)).
28 Id. at 918.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 919.
31 Id. at 918-19.
32 Id.
33 Id. (citing Blansett v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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and his failure to warn allegation. 4 In contrast to the airline in
Rodriguez, however, the airline in Blansett did provide some warnings regarding the development of DVT, which were in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration policies.3 5 Because
of those warnings, the Fifth Circuit held that the airline's failure
to warn of DVT was not an "accident" because it was not an unusual or unexpected event. 6 Reasoning that Rodriguez failed to
provide evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact as
to "whether there was either a clear industry standard or an airline policy at the time regarding DVT warnings," the court up7
held the district court's grant of summary judgment.1
The Ninth Circuit erroneously affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Air New Zealand. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment de novo, the Court must
determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact
and whether the district court correctly applied the law, and it
must do so in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.3
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides
that summary judgment should only be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law."3 Not only did the court ignore a genuine issue of material fact, it failed to conduct its inquiry in the light most favorable to Rodriguez.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that no question existed as to
whether the aircraft was operating under normal conditions.4"
However, such an assertion necessitates an analysis of what "normal conditions" and "an unexpected or unusual event" entails.
Whether it is the usual, normal, and expected operation for the
34 Id. (citing Blansett v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (S.D.
Tex. 2002)). In the initial suit before the district court, the passenger provided
evidence of an airline industry association's recommendation to warn passengers
of the dangers of DVT. Blansett, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 602. In denying the airline's
motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that a jury could find the
airline's failure to warn to be an unexpected departure from industry practice
constituting an "accident" under the Convention. Id.
35 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 919 (citing Blansett, 246 F. Supp. 2d 596).
36 Id. (citing Blansett, 379 F.3d at 180-81).
37 Id. at 918.
31 Id. at 916 (citing Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 235 F.3d
1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000)).
3" FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
40 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 917.
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airline not to inform its passengers of the dangers of DVT and
of the necessity of moving about the cabin and drinking or eating was a question of material fact in this case. The Supreme
Court in Air France v. Saks, an opinion on which the Ninth Circuit heavily relied, devoted considerable analysis to the question
of what is an "unusual or unexpected event."4 At the conclusion of the Saks decision, the Court stated that "[a] ny injury is
the product of a chain of causes, and we require only that the
passenger be able to prove that some link in the chain was an
unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger."42 Arguably, "normal conditions" not only include such things as
cabin pressurization and mechanical fitness, but also the environmental condition for the passenger. In this case, Rodriguez
neither ate nor left her seat.4" It is unclear whether "unexpected or unusual" applies to the passenger or the airline.
Surely passengers expect to be informed of the dangers of flying
and the necessary precautions that need to be taken. After all, it
is uniform throughout the airline industry that passengers are
informed of seat belt safety, exiting strategies, and operation of
breathing apparatus. Arguably, passengers expect that all the
necessary information has been provided.
The Ninth Circuit side-stepped the legal question of whether
the airline's failure to warn passengers of DVT constituted an
accident under the Convention by finding no factual question as
to whether there was an actual failure to warn.44 Both issues
could have been addressed had the court viewed Rodriguez's
contentions differently. In its brief discussion of the in-flight
magazine that Rodriguez admitted to reading, the court focused
on the magazine's recommendations regarding water and exercise. The court failed to mention whether Rodriguez had read
that particular portion of the magazine or, more importantly,
whether the text mentioned DVT at all. The impact of these
"recommendations" is much less significant if there is no mention of the importance of following such recommendations in
order to avoid DVT. Thus, the magazine alone presented a
question of fact; did the magazine's contents provide a warning?
Whether there was a failure to warn by the airline is a factrooted question. Assuming that Rodriguez proved a failure to
41
42

43
44

Air Fr., 470 U.S. at 392.
Id. at 406.
Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 915.
Id. at 919.
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warn, the case would have resulted favorably for Rodriguez. In
fact, the Ninth Circuit has previously stated that, "[t]he failure
to act in the face of a known, serious risk satisfies the meaning of
'accident' within Article 17 so long as reasonable alternatives exist that would substantially minimize the risk and implementing
with the
these alternatives would not unreasonably ' interfere
5
normal, expected operation of the aircraft.'
The Convention ranks passenger protection high among its
objectives.4 ' Airline passengers need to be cognizant of DVT, a
potentially fatal condition, when flying long distances. The airlines themselves are, no doubt, cognizant of its implications and
thus need to be proactive in their care of airline passengers.
Court decisions suggesting that the placement of magazines recommending eating, drinking, and exercising on aircraft provide
a sufficient warning merely serve to ease the burden on the airline industry. Flight attendants, without exception, inform passengers to buckle their safety belts before flights. They should
also be required to inform passengers about ways to maintain
the proper functioning of their bodies on long flights. However, such a requirement should not be so stringent as to compel flight crews to force passengers to walk around or eat-they
need only inform the public and warn them of the dangers of
DVT.
The Ninth Circuit erroneously affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment. In accordance with its interpretation of Saks, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Rodriguez's DVT
"was caused by her 'own internal reaction to the usual, normal
However, Rodriguez
and expected operation of the aircraft.'
did not have DVT when she boarded the plane. Rather, she unknowingly developed DVT during the flight. Further, following
the lead of Saks, the court refused to give weight-or to even
consider-the fact that Rodriguez did not have a preexisting
medical condition. Nor did the court define the boundaries of
the causal relationship required between the unexpected or unusual event and the operation of the aircraft, claiming that it did
not need to do so because Rodriguez failed to show her injury
was caused by such an event.4 8
",47

45 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 540 U.S.
644 (2004).
46 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
47 Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 917 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 406).
41 Id. at 918.
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Furthermore, as pointed out in an Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Rodriguez, with the exception of the Second Circuit,
the jurisdictional boundaries of the Ninth Circuit make it the
key player in defining passenger redress rights for international
flights.49 The Ninth Circuit essentially sets the law for the Western seaboard, as well as Alaska, Hawaii, and Pacific Territories,
all major gateways for long international flights. This decision
limits airline liability exposure by its interpretation of the Convention. Though the Ninth Circuit did not go so far as to hold
that an airline's failure to warn of DVT does not constitute an
"accident" under the Convention, 5° the nature of the ruling
made it seemingly difficult for future plaintiffs to successfully
bring such a claim against an airline under the Convention.
49
50

Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 6.
Rodriguez, 383 F.3d at 919.

